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Private Laws of Western Civilization t
Ernst Rabel*
PART IV. CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW1
Common law and civil law are generally believed to be
different, like oil and water, which do not mix. A sweeping
assertion that English and North American law does not present
the slightest analogy with that of Continental Europe was ex-
pressed as late as 1930. Not until the 1920's did Continental law-
yers have any clear conception of American law, and knowledge
of English institutions was a monopoly of a handful of scholars
writing on legal history, local government, or commercial law.
Some English scholars considered parts of French and German
legal history and, following Austin, extended the new "juris-
prudence" to Roman law and- its aftermath. A new period was
heralded by such leaders as Roscoe Pound, Ernest Lorenzen,
and Edwin Borchard in the United States, Josef Kohler in Ger-
many, and Edouard Lambert in France. Nevertheless, in the
general opinion of lawyers on both sides of the North Sea and
the Atlantic, to venture a study in the other half of the legal
world was believed a hazardous excursion into a dark continent.
Many may think so even today. "Civil" law is considered by
others to be uncommon, and "common" law appears somewhat
uncivil.
No doubt, a long history has impregnated the nature of both
civil and common law. The divergence reaches into the basic
conceptions and affects innumerable particulars; it concerns
mentality, habits, methods, systems, sources, and results. How-
ever, paramount questions arise: Just what are the main struc-
tural differences? What is their present scope and significance?
And to what shape will they be molded in the unceasing stream
of evolution?
* Research Associate, University of Michigan. Formerly Professor of
Law at the University of Berlin, Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for
Foreign and International Private Law, and judge in international courts.
1. Friedman, A Re-Examination of the Relations Between English,
American and Continental Jurisprudence (1942) 20 Can. Bar Rev. 175;
Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (1921); Gutteridge, Comparative Law
(Cambridge, 1946) 88 et seq.; Radbruch, Der Geist des englischen Rechts
(Heidelberg, 1947); Eder, Ciertos principios characteristicos del Common
Law, in Academia Interamericana del derecho comparado e internacional
(Cursos Monogriflcos, La Habana, 1948) 253; David, Trait6 6lmentaire de
Droit Civil Compar6 (Paris, 1950) 269-311; Cooper, The Common and the
Civil Law-A Scot's View (1950) 63 Harv. L. Rev. 468.
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These questions indicate some objects of the all-comprehen-
sive comparative studies which are the most important task of
present legal science. I have urged such researches for many
years, and after they were started successfully in Europe between
the great wars, I have been asking for them in this country. At
this moment, our knowledge has not matured enough to meet
those questions throughout with assurance. In part, mere im-
pressions must suffice. Nevertheless, one conclusion is safe.
Common law and civil law are quite comparable entities. More
than that, they are relatives not too remote, and they move
steadily nearer to each other.
Let us see first what are the main phases of the two groups
that have caused the belief in their unqualified contrariety. If we
want to get the full impact of the principles, the sharpest pro-
files of the contrasts, we ought to looK to England rather than
to the United States. When the common law traveled with the
colonists to British possessions overseas, it split into many varie-
ties and underwent modifications. In the United States the mere
fact of application in the several jurisdictions, the overriding
constitutional control, and the federal legislation have produced
a climate very different from the unity of the British Kingdom,
its homogeneous class of traditionally trained lawyers and its
ordinary courts ruling over the entire territory of England or
the Kingdom.2
I. THE MAIN DIFFERENCES
Historic Separation
The peculiar nature of common law has been designed by his-
tory. English law has had a continuous, almost uninterrupted,
development by English lawyers, kings and parliament from the
coronation of Richard I on September 3, 1189, that is, now for
760 years. Whilst the European continent went from medieval
society to the Renaissance, Humanism, Reformation, Thirty
Years' War, stagnation, revolutions, and through the crises, wars,
and social upheavals of the last century, Great Britain, on its
isles, had a revolution and a restoration, and several great wars,
but the law was never more than mildly affected. The violent
currents of thought stirred up on the Continent came as gentle
waves slapping on her shores. British character was more of
a barrier than the Channel. That country is still a hereditary
2. Goodhart, Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law (1931) 55
et seq.
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kingdom, the governing law is still the direct descendant from
Richard I's law. This is a very great fact.
Sources of Law
British common law has developed by steady tradition in
the decisions of the courts, whereas the Continental legal sys-
tems rested prevailingly on Justinian's codification and rests now
on national codes. Common law learning, said Sir Frederick
Pollock, is forensic in its origin, civilian learning is scholastic.
Indeed, our heroes, such as Sir Edward Coke, Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke, Lord Mansfield, or Chief Justice Marshall, Story, and
Holmes, were judges, and Azo, Bartolus, Donellus, Dumoulin,
Savigny, and Jhering were professors.
This contrast opposes the sources of law: the judge-made
law and the enacted law, with eiier-repeated emphasis on the
prerogative, or even monopoly, of the English judges in making
law, statutes in principle being of inferior force, declaratory of
the common law, intended to clarify and simplify the case-law.
Even if the statute is reformatory, derogatory to the common
law, it is to be construed narrowly as an exception to the great
dominating bulk of the previous decisions persistently forming
the common law. A number of rules for interpreting statutes
insist on the literal sense of the words, and have such quaint
flavor as "contemporanea expositio," " eiusdem generis doctrine,"
*or "rule noscitur a sociis."
The contrast, thus, extends to construction and application
of the law. It concerns the relationship between law and legal
theory. The traditional conception holds judicial decisions su-
perior to both statutes and doctrine. The training of the lawyers
has been characteristically influenced. English jurists have been
trained by the inns of the court, practically, empirically, in the
autonomous continuity of the profession. Continental lawyers
have been educated at the universities and taught history and
theory. Accordingly, English lawyers have never been interested
in legal history, not even in their own, despite its magnificence
and the abundance of well-preserved historical sources. (A treas-
ure largely not even printed and neglected, while we busied our-
selves reverently with the remainders of the Egyptian papyri,
described by sarcastic Romanists as holes with something illeg-
ible around.) Maitland has bitterly complained about this defect
and thereby also explained the sorry disregard for comparative
law:
1950]
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"History involves comparison and the English lawyer
who knew nothing and cared nothing for any system but
his own hardly came in sight of the idea of legal history. ' 3
The admirable history of English law, written by Maitland in
collaboration with Pollock, has stopped in the Middle Ages and
few people seem prepared to supply the special studies for com-
plementing Holdsworth's history and the handbook by Pluck-
nett.
On the other side, time and again Continental practice and
theory have worked at cross purposes. The great humanists of
the sixteenth century, Cuiacius and Donellus, wrote for the Ger-
man Romanists of the nineteenth century rather than for the con-
temporary judges who remained unimpressed. Savigny's histori-
cal school has immensely influenced the march of scientific prog-
ress, but not the courts of their time. When I first entered judi-
cial practice, my superior, an old judge, warned me that I must
thoroughly forget my university learning, and as confirmation
showed me every week the entirely useless exertions of the cur-
rent law journals. But the experiences of the twentieth century
are entirely different.
Precedents
Established upon decisions, the formation of common law
has sought stability by the principle of stare decisis. A judgment
of an ordinary court is binding on this court itself and all
coordinated and lower tribunals. A judgment of the House of
Lords is binding on all courts, now including the House itself.
It can only be changed by an act of Parliament.
This unique doctrine, a consequence of the lack of written
rules, has produced, in its turn, a very subtle art of analyzing
and distinguishing the operative facts supporting the individual
actions and defenses. It has also promoted a basic tendency
toward conservatism, of slow and cautious progress from one
case to the next one. Many centuries could continue this un-
hurried advance which, viewed in retrospect, almost appears
infallibly purposeful. But the United States has not been able
to stand this measure of movement for a long time. The civil
law has never known the principle of stare decisis nor needed it.
The common law method so acquired is naturally inductive.
The cases involving a certain situation are collected and com-
3. Maitland, Collected Papers, 188.
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pared as to facts and decisions, and by timidly progressing gen-
eralization, in the course of time, rules are reached or something
similar to rules. After seven hundred years, a considerable stock
of true rules has been accumulated, although prudence is never
forgotten. When the members of an international committee
report how some problem is treated in their respective countries,
a British jurist may state that there is no law on this question,
since it has not been decided in court. When, on urgent demand by
German and French professors, Jenks published a systematic
Digest of English law, some of his colleagues seemed apprehen-
sive. It is a comfort now to exclude any doubt that the use of
this book is legitimate, since the last edition has been edited by
Professor Winfield.
In theoretical language, Mr. Justice Holmes has formulated
correspondingly the essence of judge-made American law, in his
famous definition of law as a prediction of what judges will ac-
tually do.
No civilian will ever agree with this definition. Law for a
Continental lawyer exists irrespective of judges, whether its
source may be construed as divine or man-made, and be old
custom, judicial decision, or parliamentary enactment. The law
is not identical with the code, but it is in being before a lawsuit
is brought, and the judgment will state whether or not the right
sued upon exists-not whether the court makes this right. It is
the oldest and a permanent idea: the judge "finds" the law, and
does not make it. The laws, the rights, the duties are the order
and guides of the population; they ought to be known to every-
one, and at least be ascertainable to counsel giving advice to
the public.
This divergence would be formidable, indeed, if Holmes'
dictum were the expression of a dogma, as it is taken so often-
and not only a paradox of a skeptic, or if a civil law judge were
to read every decision in the statute, as some people believe.
Equity
The rigidity of the law obtaining in the law courts neces-
sitated the development of equitable remedies in the Chancellor's
court. A new branch of law developed in the new jurisdiction,
a dualism comparable to the competition of legal principles which
the Roman pretor gradually established at the side of the old
ius ci'vile, or to the practice by which the royal officers in the
Frankish Kingdom corrected the ancient customary law. But
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English equity in the course of time became a second set of
formal rules.
Equity in civil laws, including Louisiana's, 4 as in the Corpus
Juris, is not a branch of law but an inherent element of legal
thought, present in the great majority of legislative solutions and
judicial decisions. Aequum et justum, law and equity, is a com-
pound expressing one thing, not two. Only in a part of the sys-
tem, jus strictum, rigid law, unmitigated formal law prevails:
The text of a negotiable instrument must hold firm for the bene-
fit of innocent holders; formalities of marriage or wills must be
observed-although even in this matter European courts have
tended to leniency; the rules on land register entries must be
complied with to the letter.
Formalism, or more politely expressed, a literal approach 5
to statutes and contracts has maintained a much broader sphere
in English courts, at law as well as in equity. Its removal is
slow. Very recently it has been conceived that a legacy of "my
money" may be construed as meaning: my money and my se-
curities.' Of a case where the High Court and the Court of
Appeal held to the contrary, I privately know that the narrow
interpretation manifestly violated the intention of the testatrix.
Other General Contrasts
Among the peculiar rules of statutory construction tradi-
tional in English law, it has been emphasized that an ambiguous
statutory text must be strictly construed under English rules
and not elucidated with the help of drafts, governmental'papers,
or parliamentary debates. Continental courts do just this, some-
times digging deep into yellowed archives.
Others have contrasted the utilitarian or pragmatic philoso-
phy favored by English lawyers with the multitude of philo-
sophical systems to which French, German, or Italian writers
have adhered.
A group of typical divergences concerns the fundamentals
of government. Latin American scholars, for instance, seem
greatly interested in the American "rule of law," authorizing
judicial control of constitutionality of enactments and the admin-
istrative tribunals of the French type mentioned earlier.
4. Art. 21, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1946) 189.
6. Perrin v. Morgan [1943] A.C. 399, 410 H.L.
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Specific Differences
A few examples may substitute for the mass of big and
small differences of institutions, rules, and conceptions. The ex-
cellent land register books of Central Europe have no parallel in
England and the Americas. The Anglo-American trust is a sub-
ject of high interest for Continental lawyers who feel increas-
ingly the need for this greatest of all individual common law
achievements. In more or less extensive scope, an increasing
number of American states have adopted this institution, with
Panama as pathfinder, thanks to Ricardo Alfaro, and Louisiana
as possessing the most complete statute.7
Civil law, as is well known in Louisiana, does not recognize
the particular distinction between realty and personalty, nor
the necessary transfer of an inheritance to an executor or admin-
istrator, the "personal representative" of a deceased.
Where the common law has not been reformed by statute,
it is inclined, more than the civil laws, to lag behind the develop-
ments, and this is its greatest disadvantage in our fast living
time. Antiquity appears in the law of "bastards," the "local
actions," a theory that corporations "exist" only in the state of
their incorporation, a procedure relying on the hazard of per-
sonal service of process; here, the theory of consideration and
that of ultra vires still survive in shattered ruins-while behind
the facade all these doctrines are ripe for demolition in the
jurisdictions that have not yet discarded them entirely.
The sins of the civil laws are different but by no means less
regrettable. Instability of political and legal orders have pro-
duced an overwhelming sense of insecurity. Although European
judges have been good and in many cases excellent, the wisdom
that common law seems to have infused into judicial rulings
is not commonly paralleled. But the main trouble is caused, in
striking contrast to the German Civil Code, by hasty, confused,
superficial, and contradictory legislation.
II. THE RAPPROCHEMENT
Must we take this suggested antithesis as entirely true? as
fully effective still at present? and as significant with respect to
the United States?
7. Ricardo J. Alfaro, Adaptaci6n del trust del derecho anglo-saj6n al
derecho civil, in Cursos Monogr~flcos, cited supra note 1, at 63 et seq.
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Unwritten Law and Codification
In the United States, a country of "unwritten law," there
existed in 1947 "274 bulky volumes aggregating 267,777 pages"
of statutes, supplemented by 56,701 pages of statutes enacted in
two years, 1946-1947, according to Dean, now Chief Justice, Van-
derbilt.8 Of course, the yearly publication of 500 volumes of
court reports competes with the statutes for production records.
While organizational and administrative legislation absorbs
the greatest part, as in all other modern countries, private law
has been advanced by American state statutes in many fields,
domestic relations and tort liabilities being merely examples.
Even in England the Law Reform Committee of the Lord Chan-
cellor has sponsored drafts to abolish the Statute of Frauds,
and the fellow servant doctrine, to change the doctrines of con-
tributory negligence and of consideration; and the statute book
has incorporated acts on legitimation and adoption, divorce,
family provision in wills, the Law Reform Acts on married
women and tortfeasors, 1935; frustrated contracts, 1943; con-
tributing negligence, 1945; and personal injuries, 1948. One may
say, every one of these acts is a step in the direction of the civil
law.
In the contemporary ocean of statutes much confusion and
deficiency are due to the pressure of wars and crises. Yet this
alone does not explain the shortcomings of many legislative
products. It ought to be perceived that law making is a difficult
art and that, although not requiring a genius, it must be learned.
With our abundance of written law, enactments, ordinances,
and regulations, what becomes of the common law distinctions
between statutes declaratory of the common law and deroga-
tory statutes and the subordination of enactments to decisions?
The answer lies in the indifference shown by the American
courts. The British Sales of Goods Act is known as a typical
"codifying" statute, merely laying down the common law and
giving it a firmer expression, but not touching its great body.
Reading American decisions, you may find sometimes the statute
ignored, particularly where it affords an identical solution, but
never expressly set aside9 and, when appropriately pleaded, used
as the main directive, though not as the only one.
The attitude of the courts toward the Uniform Sales Act is
8. See Stason, The Cook Lectures: Men and Measures in the Law-
Arthur T. Vanderbilt (1949) 24 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 22.
9. Radin, A Short Way with Statutes (1942) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 395.
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not in the least different from the methods of a Swiss or Swedish
court. The new draft of a Commercial Code attempts to accumu-
late a great mass of specific solutions and to ensure the primacy
of written law in this area. If monumental American codes were
openly to declare their rank superior to judicial decisions,10 statu-
tory drafting should finally free itself from the complicated,
clumsily cautious style intended to overcome judicial hostility
to statute law.
The English rules of statutory interpretation have been
thoughtfully criticized by leading American authors as artificial
canons and limitations and as a stultifying technique disguising
rational and useful judicial activity.' 2 They enjoy so little popu-
larity in this country that their disintegration has been recently
demonstrated.'3
There is no difference, again, in the application of American
interstate commerce legislation on carriage or in the construc-
tion of insurance statutes, and the corresponding European prac-
tices. It should be clear by now that the true intention of a law
or of a contract may be discovered without any presumptions
fixed by a national law.
The case for true codification not of the judicial cases but
of the American law has been convincingly made.' 4
After resolutely abandoning the circuitous style and the
massed cases of traditional Anglo-American statutes, what type
will future American codification prefer? It is not exact that
the present statutes leave more discretion to the courts than
European codes. 15 We have noted the opposition between Ger-
10. See Pound, Common Law and Legislation (1908) 21 Harv. L. Rev.
383, 385.
11. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (1947)
47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 541.
12. Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 885.
13. Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction (1950) 24 Ind.
L.J. 335.
14. Yntema, The Jurisprudence of Codification, in David Dudley Field,
251-264.
15. The creative work of the French and German courts has been men-
tioned earlier. For new Swiss achievements see, for instance, Guhl in (1948)
84 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 524 et seq., note to Federal
Tribunal, 73 Off. Coll. II 140: the federal tribunal continues its work of
extending the scope of the action against the illegitimate father for recog-
nition of legitimate status on the expense of the ordinary paternity action
for alimony. Identical statutory texts are construed to opposite effect in
France and Belgium, Germany and Switzerland.
Ernst Wolff, Chief Justice in the British Zone in Germany, in an article,
Freiheit und Gebundenheit des englischen Richters," in Festschrift filr Wil-
helm Kiesselbach (Hamburg, 1947) 280, recommends, under the present
ideological battles, that the discretion of German courts should be restricted
according to the English experiences.
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man massive written rules and Swiss looseness of principles.
The first method is exaggerated. The second, after almost four
decades, has left gaps still unfilled by an excellent judiciary. 6
Much legal progress is likewise due to the courts of both these
countries. Hence, the field is open for reciprocal information
and a united effort to improve legislative technique.
Stare Decisis
The much advertised difference in the force of precedent
has been greatly reduced. The English professor, Goodhart, has
recognized in the United States a system so much looser and
freer than the British that he assumes the existence of three
modes of evaluating previous decisions, a British, an American,
and a civilian. The Supreme Court of the United States and the
highest state courts have conquered freedom in overruling them-
selves. The special situation of this country is commonly ex-
plained by the existence of many courts, large and rapid eco-
nomic development, and the dedication of the federal judiciary
to constitutional adjustment rather than to immutable stand-
ards. 17
But what is the practical difference between the American
method and the French or German? Anglo-American writers
are greatly impressed with the assertion sometimes occurring
in France that a single judicial decision is immaterial, while a
line of equally construed judgments, a jurisprudence constante,
"has a conclusive force of persuasion.""' The Louisiana Supreme
Court has borrowed this principle that "more than one decision
is necessary" for forming a jurisprudence, apparently, however,
for the purpose of a doctrine of stare decisis, adopted from com-
mon law. 9 But the whole idea reflects a misunderstanding.
French judges know as well as those in the entire civil law
16. See, for instance, Guhl, 83 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins
(1947) 490: the code has introduced but not implemented the right in the
surface, and the courts have not been able to fill this gap.
17. Goodhart, Precedent in English, American and Continental Law(1934) 50 L.Q.R. 40. On the American practice, see Llewellyn, Pri.judisienrecht
und Rechtsprechung in Amerika (1933); Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis
(1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 199. On theconstitutional aspect, the articles by Reed,
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Law (1938) 35 Pa. Bar. Assn. Q. 131; Doug-
las, Stare Decisis (1949) 49 Col. L. Rev. 735. On Puerto Rico, see Rodriguez
Ramos, Interaction of Civil Law and Anglo-American Law in the Legal
Method in Puerto Rico, III, Stare Indecisis? (1949) 23 Tulane L. Rev. 345.
18. This formulation by Lambert and Wasserman, The Case Method in
Canada (1930) 39 Yale L.J. 1, 15, has been relied upon by Goodhart and
many other writers.
19. Martin, J., in Smith v. Smith, 13 La. 441 (1839); Lagrange v. Barre, 11
Rob. 302, 310 (La. 1845). Cf. Note (1933) 7 Tulane L. Rev. 100.
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sphere that decisions are never a source of law, but only may
help customary law to crystallize, and that their own force
remains solely in their "mrite intrins~que," not in their form-
"rationis imperio, non ratione imperii," as G~ny has expressed
it.20 One decision may be discarded, if tentative or ill considered,
but otherwise it may exercise exactly as much persuasive power
as a string of judgments.21 Persuasion, moreover, is reinforced by
the desire to preserve judicial prestige and a stable system. The
authority so carried is entirely comparable to the remaining
force of stare decisis in the United States. There is more to the
comparison. A decision by the supreme court of the country
has the practical effect that a lower court in cases open to appeal
does not like to risk reversal by deviating; sometimes, a wanton
rebellion may result in a black mark in the personal record of
a censured judge. Judges are traditionally unremovable but
their promotion to higher positions depends on various circum-
stances. A good craftsman tries to make his decision appeal-
proof. And if lower courts in the United States are bound to the
precedents of their highest instance, it may be noted that in
Germany, the Supreme Court has established the rule that any
counsel, attorney or notary, disregarding a decision published in
the quasi-official reports of that court makes himself liable to
his clients for the consequences. 22 One has to look with a mag-
nifying glass at the real differences in the American and German
practice, in order to continue this opposition of principles.
In England, it is true, for a free construction of what the
law is, created by statutes and decisions, to use the words of one
English author, the judges would have to admit that social needs
must be fulfilled by new interpretation. He seemed to believe
that just this was in the making.23 Scottish lawyers certainly
feel binding precedent which "crept in unobserved some one hun-
dred fifty years ago" as a "superstitious fetish of ancestor wor-
ship" and want an end to its "suffocating grip. '24
Theory
No writer in this country would repeat the dictum I believe
I read in a paper of Sir Frederick Pollock: Thank God, we have
20. G~ny, Mdthode d'interpr6tation et sources en droit privc positif (1919)
407.
21. Goldschmidt, English Law from the Foreign Standpoint 39; Gut-
teridge, Comparative Law (1946) 90.
22. Reichsgericht, J. W. 1937, 1633 No. 4 (March 2, 1937).
23. Wortley, La th~orie des sources in Etudes en l'honneur de G~ny at 27.
24. Lord Cooper, Lord Justice General and Lord President of the Court
of Sessions, in his important address, cited supra note 1, at 472, 473.
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no legal theory in England-this is better than having wrong
theories as on the Continent. I do not think that there is no
theory in England and I doubt strongly that there is no wrong
theory. English judges like all good judges do not like to con-
sider a problem at the bar in terms of large implications. It is
the character of the literature during many centuries which
failed to organize critical and systematic spirit. Also in the
recent past there were not enough Frederick Pollocks. The
American scene, again, is quite different.
It is true that the really fundamental contrast of mentality
and method persists, particularly in the ways of the judges, and
is strongly sensed by the courts working with such mixed sys-
tems as those of Louisiana, Scotland, and Quebec. But the learned
literature of the western world, in a process of mutual inter-
action, clearly moves toward an eventual assimilation of pur-
poses and means of legal thought. Already, the controversial
problems, similar throughout our countries, are debated not so
much between the nations as between the views recurring within
every individual country. No one should fear, however, the com-
ing of an era of international monotony. Fortunately, national
virtues of theoretical apperception and creation will always be
magnificently different.
Basic Concepts
Many rules of English coinage have been produced by scho-
lastic method from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century
and have been petrified. Such a rule was once the naive ex-
pression of a seemingly obvious observation, then began to un-
fold its independent life and now lasts apparently forever as
dead but cumbersome dogma. This has happened in Rome, in the
Mohammedan legal theory, and this is also the explanation of,
let us cite as an instance, the doctrine of contributory negligence.
Corporal injury to a person creates liability. But: Quod
quisque ex sua culpa damnum sentit non intellegitur damnum
sentire. 25 Liability does not exist, when the injured person con-
tributed to the harm. The tort rule is not designed for such a
case. This was also the English idea at one period. But while
probably the Romans and certainly later Romanistic laws pro-
gressed to the consideration that both parties may be imprudent
and it is just that they should divide the damage in some pro-
25. Pomponius, D.50.17.203, originally speaking of legacies, Lenel, Palin-
genesia, Pomp. 260.
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portion, the English rule froze prematurely, resting on the alter-
native of burdening either the plaintiff or the defendant. (In
the transition to the modern epoque, where such accidents be-
came frequent, other considerations may have upheld the old
principle.) This phenomenon is typical for many others in the
history of legal dogma; it is only more habitual in common law,
that professional product of long standing.
Another example. The Roman doctrine in the first century
A. D. contemplated the case where A promises to B an individual
slave, Stichus, not knowing that Stichus had just died, and con-
cluded impossibilium nulla obligatio; no obligation for an impos-
sible feat, whenever the object of the contract did not exist at
the time of contracting. The same rule appears in the Sales
Acts26 and in the German Civil Code of 1896, Section 306. Now,
the contract may rightly be deemed to be without content
(inutilis) and the promisor be free because of his excusable error,
or the transaction may be fraudulent (selling the Brooklyn
bridge), or just stupid (selling a magic drink). But in many
cases the seller must be made liable for damages instead of get-
ting rid of the contract as void.
Thus, an awkward or wrong generalization devised by primi-
tive legal art is dragged along until it acquires the dignity of
uncontrovertible truth. This is the greatest disadvantage of a
continuous legal profession. Progress sweeping away such rem-
nants, also eliminates the most unpleasant differences of legal
doctrine.
Even doctrines deeply rooted in the judicial machinery must
not be fatalistically continued. At any rate, the traditional con-
trasts of systems must not be overrated. Consider the following
example.
The seller of a horse, instead of delivering it, retains it in
his own stable. The buyer wants to sue for delivery. He is
allowed to in civil law. The court will adjudge his claim, based
on the obligation of the seller to deliver; the judgment com-
mands the seller he must deliver. Under Anglo-American law,
in an action at law, no such claim is recognzed. Breach of con-
tract leads only to an action for damages. Classical Roman pro-
cedure was similar. The historical reasons for both principles
of "money estimation" have presumably also been the same:
origin from ancient penal action, simplicity of enforcement of
26. British Sale of Goods Act (1893) § 6; American Uniform Sales Act,
§ 7, 1 U.L.A. 4 (1950).
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money claims, and others. Acknowledging this difference, is it
correct to proclaim, with eminent authors, that breach of con-
tract at common law is identical with tort, or, less sweepingly,
that at common law there is no obligation for the debtor to per-
form, as at civil law-that is, to give or do or omit something-
but only to pay damages for nonperformance, for not giving, et
cetera?
What a historian should answer to these bizarre construc-
tions, has been said by the late Professor Buckland 2 7 but has
apparently not interested the routine writers. If a seller promises
a horse and retains ownership and possession of it, and if the
horse perishes by accident, the obligation of the seller is admit-
tedly extinguished. This means, he owed the horse, not money.
In Rome the classical formula of action for a promisee on the
ground of a stipulation or a sales contract expressly made the
existence of the obligation to perform specifically, the dare facere
praestare oportere, the condition for awarding the interest in
money. This is also the common law, whose wonderland we
should not exaggerate.
How the two systems work in practice is no less instructive.
Common law courts are not permitted to grant specific perfor-
mance in an action at law. But equity does accord it, hesitantly
in England, more freely in the United States. A Continental
buyer may sue for delivery of ten tons of steel, but normally-
that is, if there is, no shortage in steel-will be satisfied with
damages in money. A need for specific performance in business
is an exception, and where such need is proved, an American
and a German court will recognize it practically to the same
effect, though in different procedures.
Observant Louisiana professors have declared that Roman-
istic training has achieved a much superior supply of technical
tools and a revolution of concepts is needed in Anglo-American
law.2S While this is undeniable respecting many basic concepts
of general nature and their systematic organization, common law
has produced a wealth of commercial, maritime, and specialized
notions of inspiring force. By a give and take method, again,
prejudices are eliminated, concepts remodeled and a coherent
legal system established.
27. Euckland, The Nature of Contractual Obligation (1947) 8 Cambridge
L.J. 247.
28. Franklin, The Historic Function of the American Law Institute
(1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1367, 1391; Morrow, An Approach to the Revision of
the Louisiana Civil Code (1950) LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 59, 63, (1949) 23
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Contrasts between Legal Systems
It should finally be borne in mind that all the significant con-
trasts are by no means to be found in the opposition of Anglo-
American and Continental laws. The statutes of the American
states and the highly differentiated statutes of the European
Continent and Latin America embody rules of every kind. To
recall just a few notable matters, common law has accepted a
West-European doctrine that ownership may be transferred by
consent, forming a group (in which Louisiana especially accen-
tuates the transfer of immovables by consent), while the Cen-
tral-European countries, Argentina, and others require delivery
of movables for the passing of the title. Likewise, the English
Statute of Frauds with its American following stands with the
French group against German and Scandinavian formlessness
of obligatory contracts. But common law and the German-Scan-
dinavian group recognize rescission of contracts by formless
declaration, dispensing with those constitutive court decisions
such as the French group prescribes with judicial power to grant
the debtor days of grace, or, as in Louisiana, without such faculty.
Recognition of illegitimate children by the father is a re-
quirement for their legitimation and for certain, or all, alimony
suits in some American states, following the French model, while
others base these childrens' position with the Germanic systems,
on the blood relationship.
Dowry, once a universal institution, persists in most codes,
but in Louisiana and other jurisdictions rather on the paper only,
and has been omitted in the Code of Peru, although the French
draft proposes an extensive regulation.
The common law doctrine of consideration as a general're-
quiremernt of contracts is reduced in progressive statutes such
as in New York and the English Reform proposal.29 The require-
ment of a "cause" of obligation in the French law, so influential
on innumerable codes, has been maintained in the French Reform
work for the exclusive reason that it has become a "classical
theory" of French law.30 The Louisiana Supreme Court, it is true,
29. Report of the Law Revision Committee upon the Doctrine of Con-
sideration (1937). Cf. Cheshire and Fifoot, The Law of Contract (1945) 69
et seq. New York: see the New York statutes listed by Lloyd, Considera-
tion and the Seal in New York (1946) 46 Col. L. Rev. 1, at 16, n. 73; and id.
at 10 on the bill of 1937 abolishing the doctrine of consideration but vetoed
by Governor Lehman. Cf. the articles collected in (1941) 41 Col. L. Rev.
777-876.
30. Commission de R6forme du Code Civil, 2 Traveaux 196, 197.
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has proclaimed both requisites, cause and consideration. 31 We
can do without both of them.
Absolute liberty of testators, a dogma of the common law,
forced heirship, or other forms of restrictions on wills are no
longer characteristic of any family of legal systems.
Conclusion
Thus, it may be understood that, as I have always main-
tained, common law and civil law are not compact masses of
opposite institutions. After appropriate initiation, a scholar may
carry on comparative research on all eminent members of the
Western legal family with not more strain-though more indus-
try-than when he compares closely related systems and with
infinitely more reward in stimulating results. Certainly, com-
parative common law, 32 or comparison of Louisiana, French,
Italian, and Spanish laws, is a highly desirable class lecture.
Nevertheless, the former advocates of such restrictions as me-
thodically imperative, may have learned their lesson by now.
The literature begins to seek the true contrast between common
and civil laws less in the antiquated historic structures than in
various characteristics of the judicial organization, traditional
concepts, habits of legislators and lawyers, and methods of fact-
finding and enforcement.3 3 I think, wherever we look, we shall
easily find innumerable large and small divergencies, yet none
excluding fruitful critical analysis, and, I dare say, none in-
capable of reconciliation, as distinguished from unification.
IV. THE PROGRESS OF PRIVATE LAW
The subject matter of law-making has become increasingly
similar. The results in deciding doubtful conflicts of interests
have been strikingly analogous in the majority of cases. And
the methods of reaching these results begin to resemble each
other.
31. See Snellinger, Cause and Consideration (1934) 8 Tulane L. Rev. 178.
32. Graveson, The Frontiers of Common Law (London, 1949) Current
Legal Problems 1948, 30-46.
33. This trend is visible in the most recent writings, published after these
lectures were held, by Sereni, Book Review (1950) 24 Tulane L. Rev. 263,
and David, op. cit. supra note 1. Sereni approves the conclusion by Eder,
supra note 1, that common law is superior in ascertaining facts and means
of enforcing court orders, but attributes to the common law "much more
law" than facts and states that in truth judicial discretion is more favored
in civil law (as also observed above note 15, supra). David notes a series of
differences, and especially that French lawyers look to the law, the English
to decisions, and that in England tradition is stronger than the spirit of the
legal system.
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That the discoveries and inventions of the technological era
and the social effects of industrialization have produced similar
problems in the various countries and led to a partial unifica-
tion in restricted modern fields, such as communications, trans-
portation, and industrial property, has enlarged the area of uni-
versal legal thinking accustomed to the law merchant. The cen-
ter of isolationism is the private law in the narrowest sense,
including the law of family relations, successions, and, surpris-
ingly, contracts and torts. To these we had to call primary atten-
tion in the resurgence of international studies. The scientific
investigations are still inchoate, but of the highest importance.
However, by a remarkable fact to be observed in the recent legis-
lation, even before a comparative research has reached its fully
productive stage, the codes of civil law and American statutes
show a very great similarity in their choice of subject matters,
and certain common features in the solutions. Case law may
easily be included in this picture. On one hand, we encounter
the old familiar topics in ever renewed discussion, with mere
variants in the search for a fair or logically preferable rule.
There is an almost constant stock of ancient human achievements
which we cannot afford to miss, such as monogamous marriage,
common life of spouses and parents and children, inheritance
by descendants, binding force of the usual contracts, liability
for certain torts. Modern development, of course, has enriched
this inventory and shifted emphasis on various points. On the
other hand, in advanced society, with a growing mass of varied
interests, equalization and standardization as well as differen-
tiation occur without much reference to national particularities.
Since the German Civil Code was prepared, the old habit of legis-
lators, of borrowing rules and institutions, has been revived at
the occasion of every new code. American courts do likewise
among themselves and the English leading authors assert
that, for the sake of a common common law with the United
States, "English courts always aim as far as possible at securing,
uniformity in regard to the law of contract between the two
countries,' 34 and "that a rule of general law which has been laid
down, or approved, to substantially the same effect, in the House
of Lords and in the Supreme Court of the United States is the
law of the English speaking world wherever it has not been
excluded or varied by express legislation."35
34. Lord Wright, of Durley, Legal Essays and Addresses (Cambridge,
1939) 88.
35. Pollock, First Book on Jurisprudence (6 ed. 1937) 347.
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Courts throughout the world must learn to use foreign ex-
periences. The civil codes of the twentieth century, such as those
of Switzerland, Mexico, Italy, Greece, Peru, Venezuela, and the
Polish Code of Obligations, follow a very similar pattern of ar-
rangement, choice of topics and basic position of the problems.
They agree on an immense number of points, and they disagree
in limited areas, which tend to shrink.
All of them discuss the same social problems respecting the
conditions for marriage and for divorce, the powers of the hus-
bands,' the measure of protection accorded to illegitimate chil-
dren, tutorship by public agencies, individual and collective
labor contracts, and so forth. The technical problems coming up
everywhere for legislative decision, as, for instance, the binding
force of offers, contracting by agents, liability of heirs for debts,
are extremely numerous.
It seems to me a most remarkable result of any comparative
survey that may be made in the central parts of modern private
laws that if recurring problems are differently solved, the area
of difference is more and more restricted. The doctrine of mis-
use of a right, confined in all history to particular situations, was
modelled into a general rule by the German Civil Code, Section
226, which declares unlawful the exercise of a right for the ex-
clusive purpose of damaging another person. But who can prove
that his neighbor has dug a water well exclusively in order to
dry up the plaintiff's well? The French literature, however, went
much farther with a theory that no right should be used beyond
the scope within which it serves the intended social purposes.
Some authors considered a right enforceable only when the
plaintiff proves that he sues for a socially desirable purpose.
Then, the Swiss Civil Code, Article 2, stated that "The manifest
misuse of a right finds no protection in the law." This could mean
anything, but the Swiss courts have interpreted the provision with
the most sensible restraint. Like the Frendh courts they act
in extreme cases, such as when a strike or lockout are conducted
with the purpose of ruining the other party. The Italian codi-
fiers have expressly refused the general rule as too much extend-
ing judicial powers. This is the present alternative for legislators.
Acquisition of ownership by a purchaser in good faith was
energetically opposed in common law. The present laws show
a great variety of views. But the most recent codifications tend
either to reduce the preference for the legitimate owner to goods
stolen from him and assimilated losses, or to grant good title to
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any innocent acquirer of possession for value. The American
draft of a Commercial Code accepts the latter solution.
Great controversies have raged around the marital property
systems. Historic merger of personalities of husband and wife
during coverture on one hand, with the effect of gradually' limited
prevalence of the husband, was opposed by the feminist propa-
ganda for radical separation of property, victorious in most states
of the United States. But the systems of community property on
one hand, and administration of the wife's not-reserved property
by the husband with a half-share for the wife in the surplus-
the Swiss solution-have obtained such a respected place that the
new Venezuelan Code (Article 148 and following) contains a
very detailed regulation of community of acquets and profits,
retained as a matter of course in the Italian Code and the French
draft. Louisiana will certainly remain in the same camp, al-
though recent privileges of the wife seem not to fit into a bal-
anced system. The Swiss consideration that their middle class
handicraft and tradesmen needed the capital contribution usually
brought by brides illustrates at the same time the part to be
reserved to the local social requirements.
We are able, indeed, to write a table of the usual legislative
problems and to categorize their usual solutions. Social organi-
zations and moral convictions have become amazingly similar.
Legal technique has still to be freed from local ineptitudes.
Such a study of the recent legislative movements, even a
summary survey, would be greatly helpful for the drafting of a
new Civil Code in Louisiana. Its legislators cannot wait until
comparative research will have accomplished its huge program.
But they, more than any other draftsmen, will be forced and
eager to adjust the law of Louisiana to the needs of our time,
mirrored in the common aspects of the Western laws.
PART V. THE LAW IN THE WORLD
THE ISOLATION OF STATE LAWS
Law is order; law means peace and seeks peace with justice.
As human organizations develop, human activities grow in num-
ber and kind, and relationships become complicated-the task of
law raises myriads of exigencies. Through hundreds and thou-
sands of years, ancient and modern thinkers on state and society,
and many generations of professional men, devoted to formulat-
ing, applying, and teaching the rules of law, have accumulated an
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enormous wealth of knowledge, speculative theory, and technical
art.
Law and lawyers, however, are integrated with the life, his-
tory, and culture of a sociopolitical unit-of the old Egyptians, of
the Chatcha-Indians, of Bolivia. Certain units may embrace em-
pires where one law is influential on the others, such as in the
Roman, the Roman-German, and the British Empires. At the end
of the eighteenth century, when the codes were formed of which
the Civil Code of Louisiana is a descendant, the great enlighten-
ment of the natural law united the nations in a deep conviction.
Under its strong impulse, the laws of the sovereign states were
thought to be imperfect efforts to approach the constant, ideal,
divine law; and the Constitution of the United States, with the
Bill of Rights, has remained a permanent monument to a related
and profound idea: that principles and rights are stabilized by a
higher order that cannot be affected by the ordinary processes of
state legislatures or federal enactments.
But where no supreme law or constitutional restriction im-
poses exceptions,, every tribe, people or state has its own law,
native or borrowed. Thus, the Greeks, who were not a nation but
a plurality of cities, poleis, had distinguishable laws in every one
of them. When a citizen from Thebes came to Athens, he was not
a participant in the Athenian law, which meant that any Athen-
ian was entitled to seize him as a slave-unless the stranger was
protected by a host or proxenos. Later a treaty between the two
city-states proclaimed that he should be free of seizure, dsylos
esto--the right of asylum. The Greeks were a free people,
they founded the idea of democracy, but for them as well as for
the Romans, a polis as a matter of course consisted only of the
citizens; in the people's meetings, the citizens voted laws for citi-
zens only. A foreigner had no right, no law. Only by concessions
and finally by the great principle of the personal law, he enjoyed
treatment according to the law of his own city, the "origo" of the
Romans. Barbarians seize foreigners and kill them in honor of
their gods, or eat them without ceremony. It is a long way from
there to the Judgment (Series A, No. 7) of the World Court in
1926, stating that in the community of nations any state is ob-
ligated to grant any foreign national due process of law and re-
frain from confiscation, even though this state would not accord
this minimum of rights to its own subjects.
However, a time-came after Alexander the Great, when the
Greek dialects merged into a common Greek language and a
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rudimentary Hellenistic law could be sensed. The Greek phil-
osophers had not waited so long to speak of law and judges, of
Themis and Dike, dikastai and kritai, in a general manner and to
develop the eternal idea of justice.
In a comparable evolution, the present leading European na-
tions have formed national units in states, each having its own
law. This natural and healthful development, however, suffered
a distorted exaggeration just when the industrial and technical
age demanded a new regard for international needs.
In the last hundred years, the lawyers of all countries have
sat in airtight national compartments, always breathing the same
air and highly afraid of a draft from outside. English insularity is
the best known; it has lasted for more than seven hundred years;
it is monumental and proverbial. When Lord Mansfield, one of
the exceptional figures in English legal history, took inspiration
from Continental literature and created modern Anglo-American
commercial law, Junius in his famous letters bitterly deplored
the treason committed by Lord Mansfield who had corrupted the
noble simplicity and free spirit of our Saxon laws by importing
into the court over which he presided such elements of pollution
as the Roman Code, the laws of nations and the opinions of for-
eign civilians. And an English comparatist finds the English law-
yer still in full agreement with these feelings.' However, the
great majority of the Continental lawyers from the early nine-
teenth century until the 1920's have by no means excelled in cos-
mopolitan broad-mindedness. On the contrary, lacking the wide
horizon of the British oceangoing commerce, Frenchmen, Ger-
mans, and the other Europeans have during a century achieved a
plurality of national laws, a conglomeration of secluded legal
bodies, living separately and increasingly estranged. Each of
these legal organisms thinks of itself as "the law." There is no
"law," but only laws in the plural; consequently, it has seemed
natural that there is no legal science-apart from a few interna-
tional branches of law-in the sense of one anthropology, chemis-
try, or architecture.
This basic idea is intimately connected with the history of
modern states, and with the weighty theory of territorialism, still
much in vogue in Anglo-American law, as well as with the theory
of legal positivism which dominated the nineteenth century on
the European continent. It has remained an all pervading con-
ception, formally supported by the prevalence of statutory legis-
1. Gutteridge, Comparative Law (1946) 24.
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lation by sovereign legislatures. Louisiana statutes make law ex-
clusively within Louisiana. Texas law is a foreign law, and for
many purposes deemed to be a mere fact, not a law. Even so,
ignorance of foreign laws should not necessarily follow-but it
does! Cicero called foreign laws almost ridiculous. We law-
yers are outstanding examples of conservatism. We are hurt if
we are asked to change a word of our language; we are not en-
thusiastic about suggestions to change a rule or a code.
Division is most striking on the European Continent. France,
Spain, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and Greece have achieved
national codifications which unify their former innumerable sta-
tutes and usages, but which seal their countries off from each
other. The effect of this, probably inevitable, disjunction has
been constantly increased by acute nationalistic feelings. And
when the twentieth century accumulated the interferences by
states in the relations of individuals, the peculiarity of every
public policy was so eagerly urged as to oppose an ever present
obstacle to international harmony of law.
In the United States, thus far, methods and purposes of for-
eign law studies are just beginning to become known, although
comparative research should by no means be regarded as alien.
The coexistence of the several states and of the Federation, all
legislating in sovereignty, has resulted in a broad and extremely
useful judicial and literary national work. The Federal Constitu-
tion and the federal administration represent a measure of
unity. Technique and ideals of the common law still form the
strongest link of the lawyers. The law schools and the legal litera-
ture overcome the diversity of the state laws by crystallizing
principles of American law out of disparate rules, adjusting to
the national pattern of society and economy. Restatements and
uniform state laws purposefully, though tardively and hesitating-
ly, approach the standardization of American business and living
habits. The trend has gone from unification of mentality to uni-
fication of rules of law. At this moment, a voluminous and sub-
stantial draft of a commercial code opens a new vista. Simultan-
eously, this country has reached a position in the world which
distinctly points to a further enlargement of its legal outlook.
Among all states of the Union, Louisiana stands in a special
situation. Common law has made big inroads against which a
vigorous reaction has started, during the last two decades under
the leadership of the two great law schools. A most exciting ex-
change of ideas is in the making which will find its climax when
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the prospective new civil code is debated and the discussion will
stimulate interest throughout the country.
You live in Baton Rouge, but also in Louisiana, in the United
States, in the American Hemisphere. We do live in larger com-
munities than states. For the first time, it is imperative that we
change our outlook from provincialism to larger horizons, to em-
brace the world. Legal science, indeed, should not have been so
content with its departmental successes. Comparative research in
foreign laws should not have been so slow and so absurdly neg-
lected, especially in the common law jurisdictions of the United
States.
What are in the roughest outlines the international aspects
of the present organization of law?
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW
The civilized states of the earth form a community of states
governed by the rules of customary international law-so far
as they reach. These rules for war and peace have emerged in
the course of milleniums, producing a growing body of rights and
duties of sovereign states against one another. On the fundamental
thesis that agreements must be performed-pacta sunt servanda
-treaties between two states, or multiple treaties, conventions,
or unions have expanded to a considerable volume. Certainly, the
last two wars, pervading and devastating the globe, have shat-
tered in many honest minds the belief in any law of nations.
Skeptics, by their intellectualism, and advocates of unlimited
state sovereignty, by their nationalism, reinforce the influence of
the doubters; the dreamers and utopians are even more harmful
to sober development.
International law is not less necessary when it is more fre-
quently violated. It needs only to be better impregnated upon
the consciousness of the peoples. With all crises and reverses,
we are irresistibly led to a supranational order, which does not
mean a world government. There was a time when the families
or clans fought violently for their independence from king or
state. Management and labor, in the United States, seem united
in the forceful refusal to submit to compulsory arbitration; they
want the right to wage war. But since the United States has
helped create the Pan-American Union, the United Nations, the
Atlantic Pact, and accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the In-
ternational Court at least in principle, there can be no doubt of
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the final victory of law over force-although we have no illusions
that its day can be reached easily or quickly.
UNIFICATION
2
Public interational law is a true law in force among the
states, deserving the qualification as international. We may term
likewise suprastatual those legal rules that by agreement among
states are identical. The modem movement for internationally
uniform rules originated in the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, as a reaction against the exaggerated segregation and suc-
ceeded in matters of maritime law, cables, railway carriage, copy-
right, negotiable instruments, radio, and air. transportation. But
usually either the territorial scope does not include all states of
the earth, or the regulation comprehends merely segments of the
matter. For copyright two groups exist: the convention of Bern
and the Pan-American Convention, which the UNESCO is at-
tempting to merge. The Geneva Conventions on bills and notes
and on checks of 1930, the C.I.F. rules of the International Law
Association and an international draft for sales of goods have not
had, so far, a chance to be accepted by Great Britain and the
United States, although eminent "common lawyers" participated
in their elaboration.
The International Labor Office has worked with extraordi-
nary zeal and has offered numerous proposals for conventions, a
part of which has been carried over into important treaties on
conditions of employment; employment of women and children;
industrial health, safety and welfare; social insurance; and the
protection of emigrants.
The slow satisfaction of the undeniable need for unified law
on certain subjects is understandable. Not only are judges and
attorneys very reluctant to sacrifice their familiar rules but also
national habits, prejudices, and natural sentiments are hostile to
alien suggestions; and common law mentality refuses to yield
quickly to Continental methods. In the United States, the Con-
stitution makes it difficult, though by no means impossible, to
adhere to international conventions on private law. Occasionally,
when a treaty such as the Brussels Convention on bills of lading,
sanctioning the "Hague Rules," is styled in American business
2. "Unification of Law," by the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law, French and English (Rome, 1948); Demogue, L'unification
internationale du droit priv (Paris, 1927); Schnitzer, De la diversit6 et de
l'unification du droit (Bale, 1946).
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language, resentment in France and Italy smolders against this
indigestible addition to Latin prose. This is a counterpart to that
bitter complaint of Junius.
The truth is that most diplomatic conventions have been in-
adequately prepared. We cannot understand each other, and still
less agree with each other, if each partner insists on speaking his
particular mind in his own idiom. The diplomats have not known
and even few lawyers have clearly perceived what thorough com-
parative work has to be done before convincing proposals can be
submitted. While the laws on bills and notes were thoroughly
examined in the long preparation of unification, the "Hague
Rules" were worked out in a naive language by eminent experts
of maritime carriage, maritime insurance and finance, and were
such a delicate compromise that the state conference did not dare
to disturb the diction in a professional arrangement. On the other
hand, the Continental drafts are usually inacceptable to Amer-
icans simply because of their terminology. To breach the isola-
tionist walls, great and worldwide scientific effort is required. The
movement in the United States that has engineered the unifying
works of the Uniform Laws and the Restatements, in the present
epoch has the natural impulse to enlarge unification beyond the
geographical frontiers.
3
INTERNATIONAL LIFE
In contrast to international public law-fragmentary and con-
tested but at least supranational-constitutional, private, crim-
inal, procedural, and administrative laws are eminently national.
But in our epoch we have witnessed a rapidly and largely ex-
panding sphere of international life of individuals and corpora-
tions. Families are dispersed over the globe. Emigration creates
problems of various kinds. Associations for religious, educational,
professional or charitable purposes embrace many countries,
without having an international status which the International
Law Association and the International Chamber of Commerce
without success demanded to acquire. Business corporations oper-
ate in foreign countries. Loans are given to foreign governments,
cities, and companies. Carriage by rail, water, and air; selling
and buying of goods; insurance, bills of exchange, securities and
financial transactions circle the globe.
How does our congeries of national laws and sporadic uni-
form laws cope with the problems of family relations and in-
3. Yntema, Unification of Law in the United States, in "Unification of
Law," supra note 2, at 301.
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heritance, making and enforcing of contracts, and all conflicts
arising out of this multitude of activities and mass of business
transactions? To my knowledge, this crucial question has not
even been raised in general form, so deeply have we been en-
trenched in our own national valleys.
The answer is unfortunately obvious. Exceptions notwith-
standing, any misdeed, contract or relationship crossing the state
borders is something extravagant, unfitted for the scheme, and
not often covered by one easily ascertainable and suitable law.
Foreigners are no longer broiled on a stake, but what the ancient
principle of personal law guaranteed to the person, beyond the
law of the forum, is now in doubt.
Allow me to point out four phases of this phenomenon: the
legal position of corporations doing business in a foreign country;
the actual system used by the merchants in order to take the law
into their own hands; the branch of law called conflicts law; and
the problem of international tribunals.
Foreign corporations.4 If an American-incorporated com-
pany wants to sell machines in a Latin-American country, it has
usually to file a petition for a license to do business with the re-
spective government, present a number of documents, pay cer-
tain taxes, promise to observe certain or all laws of that state, and
to submit subsequently current reports and balance sheets. Many
of the duties included are fair. The establishment of a foreigner
cannot be privileged in matters of public trustworthiness, labor
regulations, workmen's compensation, accounting and other mat-
ters of administrative organization.
However, many states grant permission to do business ac-
cording to the pleasure of the government. Some try to control
by their own laws the capital structure or voting method or the
business done outside the state and have strangely harsh rules
against companies not registered in the country. (Mexico's Su-
preme Court has denied the right to sue for violation of a trade-
mark to an American company though it had no reason to regis-
ter there.) Vexatious bureaucratic procedures are added. Of
Panama, an excellent expert, Phanor Eder, has collected a long
list of sins, including taxation policies deliberately intended to
close the country to capital unless it submits to complete domina-
tion.5
4. 2 Rabel, Conflict of Laws (1947) 220-225.
5. Eder, The Judicial status of Non-Registered Foreign Corporations in
Panama (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 521.
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There have been companies that ruthlessly exploited their
opportunities in backward countries. There have also been coun-
tries inviting foreign capital to come in and build up an industry,
and finally confiscating the business. Against such unjust or un-
reasonable treatment of investors the Habana Charter for an
International Trade Organization of March 24, 1948,6 contains the
general and vague promises that at present can be reached in
multilateral, international treaties.
I had suggested that an international model statute should
be drafted to formulate more specific rules reconciling the legiti-
mate interests of a country admitting foreigners to use its re-
sources and labor, and the well understood interests of the
companies bringing in the much needed capital, managerial skill
and technical talent. The Habana Charter has since intervened,
but it patently needs such an implementation.
Trade. It is a striking fact that international trade has es-
tablished an awe-inspiring network of standard forms regulating
the points of characteristic interest 7 for every considerable
branch of trade, according to the special kinds of merchandise
and the typical habits of carriage or financing. The facts of the
transactions, the customary considerations of a seller or buyer,
the local facilities and the personal connections are much more
weighty than nationality and national law. Only when the en-
forcement of the contractual rights is envisaged, there has been
a tendency in the many commercial transactions influenced by
the British models to submit to the English courts, or to arbitra-
tion in London, which implied, in the English conception, appli-
cation of English law.
Recently a mighty wave of commercial arbitration has run
over the business world, in domestic as well as international com-
merce. In addition to London arbitration, the great arbitration
courts of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris and
of the American Arbitration Association in New York, as well as
a number of minor commercial arbitration centers have acquired
an immense field of operation. The American method excluding
the courts from any control of the merits of the award prevails
in the world. An award cannot be challenged because of any
6. Habana Charter for an International Trade Organization, March 24,
1948 (Washington, 1948) Arts. 11, 12.
7. Grossmann Doerth, Das Recht des Uberseekaufs (Mannheim, 1930);
Raiser, Das Recht der allgemeinen Geschftsbedingungen (Hamburg, 1935);
Di Pace, I1 negozio de adesione nel diritto privato (1941) 39 Rivista di diritto
commerciale (1941) 34.
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legal mistake or failure to apply a law, or for the failure to men-
tion any grounds for the decision. Hence, the departure from
judicial process is complete." In international matters, this un-
checked autonomy of the arbitrators, on one hand, and the stan-
dard forms, on the other hand, have accomplished a startling
emancipation from all national laws, including the conflicts laws.
Their application practically depends on the discretion of the
arbitrators. International business, so to speak, floats in the sky
on self-made clouds, aloof from the earth-and state-bound legal
systems.
Courts. Arbitration is secret. The decisions are presumably
excellent and justify the claim that they provide speedy, inexpen-
sive, and fair justice. But we do not know exactly what these
tribunals, not bound to law, working in silence and free from our
criticism, contribute to the development of commercial law. This
by itself is a serious reason for postulating the establishment of
international courts which would decide, upon the authority of
treaties, litigation in private matters. We need a judiciary of
recognized impartiality and objectivity, as familiar with the inter-
national business of traders, banks, carriers and insurers as only
the privileged courts of a few great centers are. This postulate
has been based on the cost and slowness of the national courts,
and a certain mutual distrust. But much more important for the
general progress of the law than any improvement of the en-
forcement of the individual rights is the activity of judicial bodies
working in contact with international analytical and critical
studies. Great learned achievement and high judicial accomplish-
ment have to be joined for balancing experience and theory.
They are the primary forces of any legal development, prepara-
tory to treaties and uniform statutes. 0
Conflict of Laws. Facing any ordinary case of private rela-
tions, connected with more than one state, we have to know
which of the states involved is competent to govern this case by
its law. This question of a choice where there is a conflict of laws,
8. E. Cohn, Commercial Arbitration and the Rules of Law: A Compara-
tive Study (1941) 4 U. of Toronto L.J. 1; and the articles in The Arbitration
Journal, published by the American Arbitration Association, in New York.
9. Ch. Carabiber, Les jurisdictions internationales de droit priv6 (Neu-
chatel, 1947).
10. This idea has been expounded in my paper, International Tribunals
for Private Matters (1948) 3 Arb. J. (N. S.) 209. As reported in Sanders,
Arbitration at Two International Law Conferences (1948) 3 Arb. J. (N.S.)
213, the International Bar Association at The Hague, 1948, accepted the
excellent proposal of the Leyden professor Cleveringa that an International
Maritime and Aeronautic Law Court should be established.
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again, is answered by every state as it pleases. Three states may
all claim to have their respective law applied to the same mar-
riage, will, or sales contract; or no state may want it, which is
much rarer. Of course, a large theoretical effort in the leading
nations and the instinct and fairness of the judges have reduced
the inconveniences to a moderate measure. But frictions and
doubts occur throughout the entire field of international inter-
course."
A man and a girl arrive from Venezuela and get immediately
married, although their home law prohibits their copulation.
After a year in New York, the wife goes to Reno and after stay-
ing six weeks in an auto court is divorced. In Venezuela they are
considered as living in a void marriage, in Nevada as divorced,
in New York as married, at least if the man protests. A child born
in the meantime may search for his family and inheritance rights.
The wife may remarry and some lawyers will have a good time
disentangling the legal mess ensuing. A couple has recently be-
come famous in American constitutional law because they were
declared married in Nevada and jailed for criminal bigamy in
North Carolina. But we think nothing of a child having two legi-
timate fathers in different jurisdictions.
A manufacturer in Columbus sells by correspondence prod-
ucts to a purchaser in Guatemala. The buyer refuses acceptance
and while an American court would adjudge the seller's action on
the ground of the Uniform Sales Act, the Guatemalan court dis-
misses it, applying its own law or practice.
Jute bags are loaded in New Orleans to Rio de Janeiro on an
Italian vessel. Half of the goods are stolen. Is the ship company
liable? If not prepaid, at what time is freight payable? Louisi-
ana, Italy, and Brazil, under divergent conflicts rules, applies each
its own law.
So far, we assumed that the court knows what law it has to
apply; often it does not. And the parties, before contracting, do
not know what court will be the forum.
We are not accustomed in other branches of law to such a
degree of uncertainty, contradictions, and awkwardness. His-
torical and theoretical particularism has necessarily been dam-
aging to a field where the interdependence of the countries and the
significance of private interests require harmony. If the national
11. The problem is summarized in the articles, Rabel, An Interim Ac-
count on Comparative Conflicts Law (1948) 46 Mich. L. Rev. 625, and Rabel,
Comparative Conflicts Law (1949) 24 Ind. L. Rev. 353.
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interest, or what is understood as such, and the national brand of
legal tradition and habit, are allowed free extension beyond the
domestic affairs, harmony is unobtainable. The community of
states, then-if I may quote myself-is an orchestra where every
instrument is tuned to a different key.
COMPARATIVE LAW
The primordial steps leading us from isolation to community,
in the legal field, are in comparative research. In Europe, this
has been perceived in the difficult time after the First World
War. We have created institutes for comparative law, at least
one of them with full equipment of books and a strong staff. We
have studied English law and for the first time American law,
discovered suggestions for improving our domestic legislation
and jurisprudence, advised business and government on foreign
laws, begun to form conclusions about the validity of legal
theories and prepared for legal philosophy.1 2
The United States, if it only chose to attend to an analogous
task, could avail itself of incomparable resources, personnel and
material. A small but far-seeing group of scholars in this coun-
try now postulates assumption by the United States of such full
responsibility in the promotion of law as would match the polit-
ical and economic leadership that has fallen to the United States,
almost against its will. What Wigmore postulated in 1920, that
American ideas should impress some of their features upon inter-
national legislation, while they have remained behind on the
highway of international unity,' 3 ought finally to be fulfilled
by hard work.
Quite recently the UNESCO has taken sponsorship of an
international organization for cultivating comparative law.
14
The law schools of Louisiana have recognized the value of
comparative studies for two decades and furnished the most im-
portant contributions in this country. After having seen Louisi-
ana State and Tulane at work, I am hopeful that they will go
further ahead and afford a particularly substantial cooperation
in the great task leading the science of law, after thousands of
years, to a new, a worldwide destination.
12. Rheinstein, Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany
(1935) 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 232; my article, On Institutes for Comparative
Law (1947) 47 Col. L. Rev. 227; David, Trait6 6lmentaire de droit civil com-
par6 (1950) 395 et seq.
13. Wigmore, Problems of Law (1920) 131.
14. Hazard, UNESCO and the Law (1949) 4 The Record of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York 291.
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